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THE MISGUIDED REJECTION OF FUSION VOTING BY STATE
LEGISLATURES AND THE SUPREME COURT
LYNN ADELMAN*
The American political system is no longer perceived as the gold standard that
it once was.1 And with good reason. “The United States ranks outside the top 20
countries in the Corruption Perception Index.”2 “U.S. voter turnout trails most other
developed countries.”3 Congressional approval ratings are around 20%, “and polling
shows that partisan animosity is at an all-time high.”4 Beginning in the 1970’s, “the
economy stopped working the way it had for all of our modern history—with steady
generational increases in income and living standards.”5 Since then, America has
been plagued by unprecedented inequality and large portions of the population
have done worse not better.6
Under these circumstances, many knowledgeable observers believe that
moving toward a multiparty democracy would improve the quality of
representation, “reduce partisan gridlock, lead to positive incremental change and
increase . . . voter satisfaction.”7 And there is no question that third parties can
provide important public benefits. They bring substantially more variety to the
country’s political landscape. Sometimes in American history third parties have
brought neglected points of view to the forefront, articulating concerns that the
major parties failed to address.8 For example, third parties played an important role
in bringing about the abolition of slavery and the establishment of women’s
suffrage.9 The Greenback Party and the Prohibition Party both raised issues that
were otherwise ignored.10 Third parties have also had a significant impact on
European democracies as, for example, when the Green Party in Germany raised
environmental issues that the social democrats and conservatives ignored.11 If
voters had more choices, it is likely that they would show up more often at the

* Lynn Adelman is a U.S. District Court judge in the Eastern District of Wisconsin. Judge
Adelman thanks Barbara Fritschel for her research assistance on this article.
1. David Edward Burke, Can America Break Free from the Two-Party Doom Loop?, WASH.
MONTHLY, Jan./Feb./Mar. 2020, at 50 (reviewing Lee Drutman, BREAKING THE TWO-PARTY DOOM LOOP
(2020)).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Joel Rogers, Two-Party System: Pull the Plug, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 743, 761 (2000).
6. Id. at 761–62.
7. Burke, supra note 1, at 51.
8. Id.
9. Elissa Berger, Note, A Party that Won’t Spoil: Minor Parties, State Constitutions and Fusion
Voting, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 1381, 1386 (2005).
10. The
Greenback
Movement,
ENCYCLOPEDIA
BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/event/Greenback-movement; Prohibition Party, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Prohibition-Party.
11. Green Party of Germany, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/GreenParty-of-Germany.
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polls.12 Also, additional viable parties might well push the major parties into being
more responsive.13
However, third parties in the United States face many obstacles. “Virtually all
. . . elections are decided by plurality voting . . . in single-member election
districts.”14 Such elections are winner take all, and they are not friendly to third
parties which command the support of only a minority of voters.15 And even voters
inclined to support third party candidates often fear that by doing so they will
“waste” their vote on a candidate with no chance of winning or, worse, “spoil” the
result by taking needed votes away from their second most favored candidate and
throwing it to the least favored.16 This problem is known as Duverger’s Law, which
states that a two-party duopoly possesses a natural equilibrium.17 Thus, of about a
“thousand minor parties formed in the United States since the 1840s, only ten have
polled more than six percent of the Presidential vote.”18 Few have elected
candidates of their own or been important electoral players for more than a few
election cycles, and then only during economic crises or war.19 And if they raise
issues that are attractive, such issues are usually co-opted by one of the major
parties. “As the great historian, Richard Hofstadter [put it] . . . : ‘Third parties are
like bees, once they have stung, they die.’”20
Consider in this regard the vote for Ralph Nader in his 2000 and 2004
presidential campaigns. In 2000, 2.8 million people voted for Nader.21 These voters
were clearly dissatisfied with the policies of the major parties and wanted to send
a message. But in 2004, Nader received 2.4 million fewer votes, likely because
voters feared wasting their votes or allowing Nader to spoil the election for the
Democrats.22 Thus, as it presently works, the two-party system diminishes the
message of third parties and makes it difficult for them to sustain themselves. This
distinctly disadvantages voters who are intent on seeking change.
Scholars have proposed a number of ways to strengthen third parties. Political
scientist Lee Drutman and many others advocate that we implement ranked choice
voting, a system in which voters rank their first, second and third choices and so
on.23 Votes for the lowest-performing candidates are redistributed to the second
choice of that candidate’s voters, and this continues until one candidate reaches
the requisite threshold and wins.24 Ranked choice voting rewards candidates with
broad appeal and leads to less divisive campaigns since candidates benefit from

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Berger, supra note 9, at 1386.
Id.
Rogers, supra note 5, at 746.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Rogers, supra note 5, at 747.
Berger, supra note 9, at 1383.
Id.
Burke, supra note 1, at 51.
Id.
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being voters’ second or third choices.25 Several cities in the United States, including
San Francisco and Minneapolis, employ ranked choice voting.26
A less powerful means of strengthening third parties is fusion voting, also
known as cross-nomination, multiple-party nomination, or open-ballot voting.
Fusion voting is an electoral strategy in which a major party and a third party agree
to nominate the same candidate for the same office in the same election. 27 Fusion
voting enables voters to contribute their votes to candidates running on third party
tickets who, because they are also major party candidates, have a chance of
winning. This enables third parties to share credit for their victories. It also enables
third party voters to send strong messages to political parties, candidates and public
officials, and to demand action on policy issues without fear that they will waste
their vote or help elect a candidate who they oppose.28 In a primary election under
fusion voting, ballots are counted separately for each party, and the candidate with
the most votes on each party’s ballot line is that party’s nominee. In a general
election, the candidate’s votes on each party’s ballot are combined thus allowing a
third party the opportunity to provide the votes that constitute the margin of
victory if the race between the two major party candidates is close29—something
that has occurred frequently in American history. Thus, fusion enables third parties
to enter the political mainstream.
Unfortunately, fusion voting is unlawful in some 43 states and the District of
Columbia.30 In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, most of these
jurisdictions enacted laws prohibiting candidates for elected office from accepting
the nomination of more than one party. 31 Before that, fusion was a prominent
characteristic of U.S. politics and was particularly significant in the West and
Midwest.32 By fusing with one of the major parties, third parties were able to
influence election results and thus public policy.33 At that time, the process of voting
was different. Prior to the 1890s, citizens voted by dropping a ballot listing the
candidates they had chosen in an actual ballot box.34 Typically, political parties
printed the ballots which listed the party’s slate of candidates, although sometimes
voters would create their own ballots.35 Under this system, the state did not
participate in the determination of what groups constituted political parties or what

25. Id.
26. Id.
27. STEVE COBBLE & SARAH SISKIND, FUSION: MULTIPLE PARTY NOMINATION IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (1993)
(copy on file with author).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. ADAM MORSE & J.J. GASS, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, MORE CHOICES, MORE VOICE: A PRIMER ON FUSION
1 (2006), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/more-choices-more-voicesprimer-fusion.
31. Id. at 2.
32. COBBLE & SISKIND, supra note 27, at 2.
33. Id.
34. MORSE & GASS, supra note 30, at 2.
35. Id.
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candidates they could nominate.36 Parties that wished to fuse could lawfully list the
same candidate on their ballots.37 And, in fact, cross-endorsing was an important
part of the system.38
Beginning in 1888, after a particularly corrupt presidential election, both the
federal government and the states implemented the Australian ballot, a
government-printed ballot listing the candidates.39 Voters filled out these ballots by
themselves in voting booths. Although the change was initiated primarily to
eliminate such forms of corruption as voter intimidation and vote-buying, the new
system also gave government unprecedented control over the electoral process.40
And the political party that controlled a particular government banned fusion voting
for the purpose of solidifying its own power.41 Fusion bans were part of an extensive
recasting of American electoral politics that included the Jim Crow system in the
South, an elaborate set of rules to prevent African-Americans from voting, as well
as a variety of mechanisms to push Northern immigrant and working class voters
out of the electorate.42
This recasting accelerated after the election of 1896 in which the Republicans
took control of state legislatures throughout the country. 43 In 1893, South Dakota
enacted the first anti-fusion law, barring candidates from being listed more than
once on a ballot.44 In 1895, Ohio, Michigan, Wisconsin and Oregon passed similar
laws, and eight more states followed suit in the next four years.45 All of these
statutes were enacted by legislatures controlled by Republicans who sought to
prevent cooperation between Democrats and third parties.46 The partisan purpose
of these laws was lost on no one. One Michigan legislator publicly acknowledged
that the Republicans were not interested in allowing “the Democrats to make allies
of the Populists, Prohibitionists, or any other party, and get up combination tickets
against us.”47 One journalist called the anti-fusion law “the law providing for the
extinction and effacement of all parties but the Democratic and Republican.”48 And
a Populist Party member said that it in effect “disfranchise[d] every citizen who . . .
[is not] a member of the party in power . . . .”49
The partisan purpose behind the fusion bans obscured the fact that, as
discussed, the case for permitting fusion voting was and is very strong. New York
State, where fusion is alive and well, provides the best example. Because of fusion,
six minor parties in New York have official party status which they obtained by
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.; see also S.J. Ackerman, The Vote that Failed, SMITHSONIAN MAGAZINE (Nov. 1998),
https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/the-vote-that-failed-159427766/.
40. MORSE & GASS, supra note 30, at 2–3.
41. Id. at 3.
42. Rogers, supra note 5, at 749.
43. Id.
44. Berger, supra note 9, at 1388–89.
45. Id. at 1389.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
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securing 50,000 votes in gubernatorial elections.50 Each of these parties has
considerable influence on the issues on which they concentrate. The Working
Families Party, for example, focuses on bread and butter issues like the minimum
wage that are of particular interest to working class voters.51 Unlike the Green
Party, the Working Families Party does not put up protest candidates who have no
chance of winning.52 Rather, it cross-endorses Democratic candidates, bringing to
them votes that they otherwise might not receive and sometimes providing the
margin of victory.53 As a result, the Working Families Party has developed
considerable influence over Democratic officials and has been relatively successful
in pulling Democrats to the left.54 Its efforts led to New York’s enaction in 2004 of a
minimum wage law.55 It brings new ideas and creativity to state politics, mobilizes
voters, and stimulates turnout.
Fusion also brings other benefits such as, for example, contributing to
integrating voters into the political system. It does this by decreasing the likelihood
that a candidate with only a plurality but not a majority of votes will win. 56 This
results from the fact that fusion encourages voters who are further from the
political center to express their views by voting for a major party candidate on a
third-party line.57 Fusion also encourages major party candidates to distinguish
themselves from each other and make the choice between them more meaningful.
In 1970, for example, James Buckley was elected to the Senate from New York on a
third party line.58 Buckley, a conservative, took advantage of the fact that the
Democratic and Republican Parties both nominated relatively liberal candidates. 59
The Republicans did this because they viewed the median New York voter as being
somewhat liberal, and they made a strong effort to appeal to that voter.60 Buckley’s
victory, however, made it clear to future Republican candidates that they could not

50. Ballot Access Requirements for Political Parties in New York, BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/Ballot_access_requirements_for_political_parties_in_New_York (last visited
May 19, 2020).
51. See Berger, supra note 9, at 1392.
52. Id.; Howie Hawkins, The Contradictions of Cross-Endorsements in the Governor’s Race, GREEN
PARTY US (May 10, 2018), https://www.gp.org/cross_endorsements (Green Party).
53. Celia Curtis, Cross-Endorsement by Political Parties: A “Very Pretty Jungle”?, 29 PACE L. REV.
765, 768 n.15 (2009).
54. Molly Ball, The Pugnacious, Relentless Progressive Party That Wants to Remake America,
ATLANTIC (Jan. 7, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/01/working-familiesparty/422949/; Anna Orsoo, What’s the Working Families Party, and How’s it Different From Regular
Democrats?, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER (Nov. 6, 2019), https://www.inquirer.com/news/philadelphiaworking-families-party-explained-progressives-democrats-elections-20191106.html; Mark Pazniokas,
The Working Families, Pushing Democrats to the Left, CONN. MIRROR (Feb. 11, 2018),
https://ctmirror.org/2018/02/11/the-working-families-pushing-democrats-from-the-left/.
55. Berger, supra note 9, at 1292.
56. MORSE & GASS, supra note 30, at 5.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
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cater to the median voter without potentially losing the conservative vote, and that
such vote might make the difference between victory and defeat.61
Fusion has been criticized, but the criticisms are not well founded. Some critics
have argued that fusion results in third parties that exist solely to secure patronage
appointments for party leaders or their cronies.62 Patronage, however, is a
longstanding problem, and there is little reason to think that fusion makes it worse.
Stronger third parties may result in the reallocation of some patronage from a
major party to a third party, but it is highly unlikely that it adds patronage
positions.63 Further, third parties that exist primarily to secure patronage tend not
to last long. The Liberal Party in New York is a good example.64 It gave up on trying
to influence policy and used its ballot line solely to bargain with the major parties
for patronage and campaign contributions.65 As a result, it lost support and
ultimately its ballot line and was replaced by the Working Families Party, a genuine
policy-oriented party.66
Others have argued that by aiding third parties, fusion helps extremist
groups.67 The strength of third parties, however, depends on their ability to attract
votes, and in a democracy, if they can do this, they deserve to be taken seriously.68
The answer to an extremist third party is not to ban it, but to defeat it at the polls
and for major party candidates to refuse to accept its nomination. In any case, the
main cause of political party extremism in the United States is not fusion, but
partisan gerrymandering, which the Supreme Court unfortunately has now
authorized.69 Critics have also asserted that fusion would diminish the identity of
third parties.70 This, however, is an extremely weak argument because under fusion
third parties choose whether or not to endorse a major party candidate. They need
not be protected from themselves.
Finally, some anti-fusionists contend that the present two-party duopoly
works well, and that fusion would undermine it. 71 But the two-party duopoly is far
from ideal. It tends to marginalize important viewpoints and, in some regions of the
country, intersecting with local political attitudes, it produces one-party states.72 In
such states, fusion could perform the positive function of reducing and dispersing
the power of the party in power.73 In any case, fusion would not weaken, much less
undermine, the two-party system. As long as we have single member districts and
plurality elections, the two-party duopoly will remain. Fusion would actually
strengthen the two-party system by enabling third parties to contribute more than

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id.
MORSE & GASS, supra note 30, at 6.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 6.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 7.
MORSE & GASS, supra note 30, at 7.
Id. See Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019).
MORSE & GASS, supra note 30, at 7.
Id. at 8.
Id.
Id.
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they do now.74 Essentially, state legislatures should pay attention to the positive
role fusion plays in New York and legalize fusion voting.
Notwithstanding the benefits to the electoral system of fusion voting, since
the turn of the 20th century it has been largely moribund except in New York. 75
Moreover, fusion voting has sustained a powerful additional blow. In the late 1980s
and early 1990s, roughly a century after most states outlawed fusion, progressive
activists led by University of Wisconsin political science professor Joel Rogers, his
wife attorney Sarah Siskind, and New York organizer Dan Cantor, who later became
executive director of the Working Families Party, began to explore the possibility of
a constitutional challenge to anti-fusion laws.76 They created a new political party,
appropriately named the New Party, that they hoped to develop both as a
progressive force and a vehicle for their constitutional challenge. 77 They believed
that a multi-party system would provide Americans with more responsive
government, but that a legal challenge to single member districts or to plurality
voting or both was unlikely to succeed.78 Thus, they developed a strong legal
argument against anti-fusion laws. Their argument was based on the right of free
expression as provided in the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 79
The argument that voting is an expression of belief as well as a choice of a
candidate is a compelling one but, in Burdick v. Takushi the Supreme Court held
that states could prohibit voters from writing in candidates not listed on the ballot
and rejected lower court decisions supporting the concept of ballot-based
expression.80 Although Burdick has been much criticized,81 it compelled the New
Party to rely on the right to freely associate rather than on the right to freedom of
expression.82 The Court had previously held that the right to associate was
derivative of the First Amendment rights to speak and worship and petition for the
redress of grievances.83 Rogers and his colleagues’ goal was to definitively establish
as fundamental associational freedoms the right of political parties and their
members to decide what candidates to support and what political strategies to
employ, and the right of third parties to participate in a system that did not
invidiously discriminate against them.84 They argued that anti-fusion laws burdened
the first right by prohibiting qualified parties from nominating consenting qualified

74. Id.
75. Id. at 3.
76. Berger, supra note 9, at 1393.
77. Id.
78. Rogers, supra note 5, at 746, (legal challenge). Id. at 765–66 (responsive government).
79. Berger, supra note 9, at 1393–94.
80. Id.; Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992).
81. See, e.g., Jeanne M. Kaiser, Constitutional Law—First Amendment—No Constitutional Right
to Vote for Donald Duck: The Supreme Court Upholds the Constitutionality of Write-in Voting Bans in
Burdick v. Takushi, 15 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 129 (1993).
82. Berger, supra note 9, at 1395.
83. Id.; see Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
84. Berger, supra note 9, at 1397–98.
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candidates and to strengthen themselves through cross-endorsement.85 They
further argued that anti-fusion laws violated the second right because their sole
purpose was to drive third parties like the New Party out of the system, an assertion
that none of their opponents contested.86
Prior to Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party,87 the case in which the New
Party’s challenge reached the Supreme Court, the Court had struck down a number
of state laws involving political parties’ association rights. The Court had previously
decided, for example, that states could not require political parties to accept
delegates not selected pursuant to party rules and could not bar parties from
endorsing candidates in primaries or require them to nominate candidates through
the use of a closed primary.88 And in a case involving a minor party, Williams v.
Rhodes, the Supreme Court included language very supportive of the New Party’s
position.89 The Williams Court held unconstitutional an Ohio statute requiring
parties to obtain signatures of ten percent of the voters as a condition of being
listed on the ballot and stated that “new parties struggling for their place must have
the time and opportunity to organize in order to meet reasonable requirements for
ballot position, just as the old parties have had in the past.” 90 And it went on to
reject Ohio’s defense of the law based on the two party system:
[T]he Ohio system does not merely favor a “two party system;” it favors
two particular parties—the Republicans and the Democrats—and in
effect tends to give them a complete monopoly. There is, of course, no
reason why two parties should retain a permanent monopoly on the
right to have people vote for or against them. Competition in ideas and
governmental policies is at the core of our electoral process and of the
First Amendment freedoms.91
Although Williams was a decision of the Warren Court, it gave the New Party
organizers reason to be hopeful.92 Their first lawsuit, Swamp v. Kennedy, arose out
of Wisconsin’s refusal to permit the Labor-Farm Party to name Douglas LaFollette,
who had already been named the Democratic candidate, as its candidate for
Secretary of State even though LaFollette consented to the second nomination.93
The suit failed, but three highly respected conservative judges, Judges Ripple,
Posner, and Easterbrook, dissented from the Seventh Circuit’s refusal to rehear the
case en banc, writing that:

85. Brief for the Respondent at 12, Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351 (1997)
(No. 96-1608).
86. Id. at 32.
87. 520 U.S. 351 (1997).
88. Democratic Party of the U.S. v. Wis. ex rel. LaFollette, 450 U.S. 107 (1981).
89. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
90. Id. at 32.
91. Id.
92. Berger, supra note 9, at 1397–98; see Rebecca E. Zeitlow, The Judicial Restraint of the Warren
Court (And Why it Matters), 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 255 (2008) (discussing the difference in approach between
the Warren and Rehnquist courts on protecting the rights of belonging).
93. Swamp v. Kennedy, 950 F.2d 383, 384 (7th Cir. 1991).
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The Supreme Court has recognized that the right of a party to nominate
a candidate of its choice is a vital aspect of the party’s role in our
political structure. The ability to choose the same person as another
party is an important aspect of that right. It allows a party to form
significant political alliances. When a minor party nominates a
candidate also nominated by a major party, it does not necessarily
“leech onto” the larger party for support. Rather it may—and often
does—offer the voters a very real and important choice and sends an
important message to the candidate. If a person standing as the
candidate of a major party prevails only because of the votes cast for
him or her as the candidate of a minor party, an important message has
been sent by the voters to both the candidate and to the major party….
A state’s interest in political stability does not give it the right to
frustrate freely made political alliances simply to protect artificially the
political status quo.94
Subsequently, Rogers and his colleagues challenged Minnesota’s anti-fusion
law. A candidate for the legislature wanted to run with endorsements both from a
major party, the Democratic-Farm-Labor Party, and the New Party.95 Pursuant to its
anti-fusion law, Minnesota denied the New Party’s nomination petition and
defended the law mainly on the ground that its interest in avoiding voter confusion
outweighed the burden on the New Party’s associational freedoms. 96 This
justification, and others put forward by Minnesota, were extremely weak, and the
Eighth Circuit had little difficulty in ruling in favor of the New Party.97 Unfortunately,
in a six to three decision, the Supreme Court reversed,98 and did so on a ground that
Minnesota had not even asserted, a ground that at oral argument Justice Scalia
prompted Minnesota’s counsel to rely on, namely, that states had a constitutional
right to protect the major parties, the Republicans and Democrats, from
competition.99 The Rehnquist Court declared that the Republican-Democrat
duopoly brought about stability, that the state had an interest in protecting
stability, and that it could therefore enact laws protecting the two major parties. 100
In his opinion for the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist did not actually explain
how the two-party system encouraged stability or how fusion threatened it. 101
Rather, the opinion assumed that accommodating the interest of a minor party
would threaten the system. As Professor Rick Hasen put it, the Court did not
carefully examine the premise that the two-party duopoly was worthy of protection
94. Id. at 388–89 (Ripple, J. dissenting) (citations omitted).
95. Twin Cities Area New Party v. McKenna, 73 F.3d 196, 197 (8th Cir. 1996).
96. Id. at 199.
97. Id. at 200.
98. Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 370 (1997).
99. Id. at 367. Transcript of Oral Argument at 25-26, Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520
U.S. 351 (1997) (No. 95-1608).
100. Timmons, 520 U.S. at 369–70.
101. Id. at 377–78 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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nor, even if it was, whether Supreme Court protection was necessary.102 Without
saying so, Rehnquist’s opinion overruled Williams as well as another Supreme Court
decision, Anderson v. Celebrezze,103 that relied on Williams. In dissent, Justice
Stevens, joined by Justice Ginsburg, persuasively argued that the stability rationale
relied on by the majority was entirely speculative. 104 To the contrary, he explained
that:
[T]he fusion candidacy is the best marriage of the virtues of the minor
party challenge to entrenched viewpoints and the political stability that
the two-party system provides. The fusion candidacy does not threaten
to divide the legislature and create significant risks of factionalism,
which is the principal risk proponents of the two-party system point to.
But it does provide a means by which voters with viewpoints not
adequately represented by the platforms of the two major parties can
indicate to a particular candidate that—in addition to his support for
the major party views—he should be responsive to the views of the
minor party whose support for him was demonstrated where political
parties demonstrate support—on the ballot.105
As Professor Terry Smith explains, Timmons reflected the Rehnquist Court’s
general antipathy to outsiders including minor political parties, and its inability to
articulate intelligible standards for assessing infringements on parties’ associational
rights.106 In this respect, as Smith points out, Timmons is also difficult to square with
precedent, not only with Williams and Celebrezze, but also Tashjian v. Republican
Party of Connecticut.107 In Tashjian, the Court upheld the Connecticut Republican
Party’s attack on a closed-primary law which prohibited independent voters from
participating in major party primaries.108 The Court rejected Connecticut’s assertion
that its closed-primary law furthered its interest in fostering a strong two-party
system, stating:
The [Republican] Party’s determination of the boundaries of its own
association, and of the structure which best allows it to pursue its
political goals, is protected by the Constitution. “And as is true of all
expressions of First Amendment freedoms, the courts may not interfere

102. Richard L. Hasen, Entrenching the Duopoly: Why the Supreme Court Should Not Allow the
States to Protect the Democrats and Republicans from Political Competition, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 331, 332
(1997).
103. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 787–806 (1983).
104. Timmons, 520 U.S. at 370–71 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
105. Id. at 380–81.
106. Terry Smith, A Black Party? Timmons, Black Backlash and the Endangered Two-Party
Paradigm, 48 DUKE L.J. 1, 7–8 (1998).
107. Id. at 19.
108. Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 210–11 (1986).
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on the ground that they view a particular expression as unwise or
irrational.”109
In Tashjian, an entrenched elite interest, the Connecticut Republican Party,
successfully sought to define its own associational rights.110 In Timmons, the New
Party, an outsider entity, sought to do the same,111 but for reasons which are
difficult to reconcile with Tashjian, its efforts were deemed politically destabilizing
to Minnesota.
It is also valuable to compare Timmons to Abrams v. Johnson, a redistricting
case decided at about the same time, in which the Court struck down a Georgia law
creating two new majority-minority congressional districts on the ground that the
redistricting process was impermissibly infected by race.112 “[I]n both cases the
Court denied a disfavored political minority . . . access to the two-party system on
the erroneous assumption that [accommodating its] interests would harm the
political process.”113 Further, the effect of both cases was not only to harm political
minorities but also racial minorities.114 Clearly uncomfortable with racial claims of
insufficient access to the two-party system, the Abrams Court emphasized that
redistricting should be colorblind.115 And the Timmons Court did not give weight to
the racial dimension of the New Party, the fact that African-Americans constituted
40% both of the Party’s membership and its national executive committee.116 The
New Party had made a special effort to recruit African-Americans and to promote
policies attractive to them.117 Abrams limited direct black participation in the two
party system, and Timmons limited black participation via the vehicle of a third
party.
In sum, the Court’s handling of anti-fusion laws is problematic. As Joel Rogers
put it, if the Supreme Court perceives something as mild as fusion as a threat to our
political system, sufficient to outweigh powerful First Amendment interests, we are
in serious trouble.118 Further, the likelihood that any governmental institution will
look favorably on fusion anytime soon is slim. Legislatures are not likely to
overcome their own partisan interests, and the Supreme Court is unlikely to modify
the decision it made in Timmons. One commentator argues that state supreme
courts could pick up the slack by taking a more favorable approach to fusion under
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state constitutions.119 This could happen, but it is also unlikely. Nevertheless,
nothing is forever, and it is essential to keep good ideas like fusion voting alive.

119. Berger, supra note 9, at 1404.

